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Abstract: While Schön’s work is prominent in design literature, some of its concepts
stay unclear. In this paper we examine the distinctions Schön made in 1992 between
“reflection-in-action” and “reflection on reflection-in-action” (or “conversation with
the situation” and “reflective conversation with the situation”). To clarify the meaning
of these two terms, we will refer to pragmatist philosophy, using Dewey’s work on
inquiry and epistemology. Our results show that there is indeed a difference between
the two expressions. Moreover, revisiting Dewey’s and Schön’s work allows for a new
visual representation of the reflection-in-action process, which can then be used as a
tool to enhance the designers’ reflection on reflection-in-action.
Keywords: Reflection-in action; Reflective practice; Pragmatist inquiry; Dewey

1. Introduction
Are we using Schön’s work properly? By “we”, we mean the design research community. By
“properly” we refer to questions raised by Beck and Chiapello during the DRS
conference 2016. In their paper, they stressed that Schön was highly cited, but scarcely built
upon or criticized (Beck & Chiapello, 2016). They even stressed that the meaning of
“reflective practice” is often unclear.
While the question “what do we mean by reflective practice?” may sound rhetorical, it is
central to the field of design. Indeed, many design researchers argue that Schön’s reflective
turn has been a cornerstone of research in design for the past 4 decades, as Schön gave a
new breath to design research with his epistemology of practice (Bousbaci, 2008; Cross,
2011; Galle, 2011; Lawson & Dorst, 2013).
At the end of his life, Schön himself tried to clarify his wording. In his paper The Theory of
Inquiry: Dewey’s Legacy to Education (1992), he highlights a difference between what he
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
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called the “conversation with the situation” (a form of reflection-in-action) and the
“reflective conversation with the situation” (which is a reflection on reflection-in-action).
Nowadays, Schön’s work on reflective practice is admittedly related to Dewey’s pragmatist
inquiry. However, such a connection has not always been evident. In his 1997 doctoral
dissertation, Dorst links Schön’s work with phenomenology and idealism, but not
pragmatism (Dorst, 1997). Additionally, in The Reflective practitioner How professional Think
in Action (1983), Schön refers to Dewey only twice, and relatively briefly. Nonetheless,
Schön’s doctoral dissertation (1954) built on Dewey’s theory of inquiry, and in 1992, Schön
reaffirmed his affiliation to Dewey:
“Logic, which I took as the basis for my doctoral thesis, was the book that changed my
mind about Dewey. Some thirty years later, in the midst of writing The Reflective
Practitioner, I realized that I was reworking that thesis, now on the basis of empirical
studies of professional practice that would have been out of order in the Harvard
philosophy department of the mid-1950s. I was attempting, in effect, to make my own
version of Dewey’s theory of inquiry, taking “reflective practice” as my version of
Dewey’s “reflective thought” (Schön, 1992, p. 123).

Since then, many other researchers (Dalsgaard, 2014; Dixon, 2020; Lake, 2014; Melles,
2008; Rylander Eklund et al., 2021) highlighted the importance of the pragmatist toolbox
and epistemology in design research.
In this paper, we will demonstrate that understanding Dewey’s theory can help clarify
Schön’s writings. Specifically, we will compare the structure of Schön’s “conversation with
the situation” with Dewey’s pragmatist inquiry. Thus, this paper will relate Dewey’s work
(Logic The Theory of Inquiry, especially the chapters 4 and 6) with Schön’s work (The
Reflective Practitioner and the paper The Theory of Inquiry: Dewey’s Legacy to Education).
We will use the “conceptual analysis” method, defined as a “disciplined analysis of the
concepts we think with”(Bardzell & Bardzell, 2016, p. 23).
Our aim is to strengthen the filiation between Dewey and Schön, while clarifying the
differences that Schön made between a “conversation with the situation” and a “reflective
conversation with the situation”. We will show how their respective works are similar on
two points: the “crisis” that they wanted to overcome and the solution they suggested (the
inquiry). Then, we will dissect an alleged difference in their understanding of reflective
practice. Finally, we will present a graphic model of design inquiry that can be seen as a
fusion of both their theories.

2. A Similar crisis between knowledge and action
This first part of our comparison between Schön and Dewey’s work will start with an
explanation of the “crisis” that both Schön and Dewey tried to overcome concerning
knowledge and action. We will show here that Schön’s work resonates with Dewey’s,
despite being decades apart.
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2.1 Dewey and the Rationality Crisis
Dewey began his philosophical journey with a critique of the rationalist foundations of
scientific thought of its time, which were mostly Cartesian. Following Peirce, he rejected the
idea of a perfectly ordered universe, governed by determinism. He criticized the ways in
which modern science had infiltrated all aspects of human action, imposing a mechanistic
attitude governed only by physical and mathematical laws. According to him, this view
prevents the resolution of everyday problems, like political or economic problems (Dewey,
1938), which are too complex to be addressed by this reductionist approach.
For Dewey, this view comes from an outdated philosophical interpretation of the world, and
not from the scientific method (or experimental method) itself. Indeed, Dewey showed that
experimental science, despite the dazzling advances in knowledge it has enabled, is based on
an obsolete philosophical model. Its concepts of reality, knowledge and action must be
revisited.
According to Dewey, the logic of science was based on a philosophical notion of knowledge
dating back to Aristotle, where knowledge is thought of as pre-existing to man and
immutable. At that time, the techniques were separated into “inferior” and “superior”. The
inferior techniques consisted of daily practical work (framing, dyeing, pottery…). The higher
techniques were those that dealt with more important spheres: “the welfare of the people
and especially its rulers-and this welfare involved transactions with the forces that ruled the
universe” (Dewey, 1938, p.72). Aristotle’s system thus succeeded in transforming sociocultural differences into a philosophical distinction. “The dualism of the empirical and
rational, of theory and practice”(Dewey, 1938, p. 73). Dewey added that this vision of
knowledge, of science, of theory, relegates man to a “position of spectator” (Dewey, 1929,
p. 20). There is no interaction with knowledge, because it is pre-existing. The subject only
discovers what is already there.
Unfortunately, according to Dewey, these concepts were embedded in the modern
experimental method. This led to the idea that the scientific method makes it possible to
“discover reality”, which amounts to identifying knowledge with reality. According to Biesta
and Burbules, Dewey believed that confusing knowledge with reality, or “what is known with
what is real” (Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p. 15), is one of the major errors of modern
philosophy. Indeed, if we confuse knowledge and reality, then human action is only deemed
real if it can be validated by our knowledge: “Love is only considered to be real if it can be
explained in terms of hormones” (Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p. 15). Things that cannot be
analyzed are deemed to be unreal, and thereby irrational.
As a result, a line is being drawn between human action (which Dewey calls common sense)
and the field of knowledge and theories. The former is considered irrational, while the latter
is viewed as rational and unrelated to human action. This results in an impossibility to
understand human action, because it is irrational, without logical foundations.
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To overcome this situation, Dewey established a new logic of science (Dewey, 1891) and a
redefinition of knowledge. Treating the subject like a spectator no longer functions when
considering modern science—where knowledge and experimentation are undoubtedly
linked (Christie et al., 2002). For Dewey, knowledge is rooted in action—His theory of action
can be seen as a theory of knowledge through experience, or “theory of experimental
learning” (Biesta, 2010, p. 107; Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p. 37). Knowledge is what we learn
by reflecting on our experiences. It is not a question of acquiring fixed knowledge, but rather
a predisposition to act: “this learning is, however, not the acquisition of information about
the world ‘out there’ really is. It is learning in the sense of the acquisition of a complex set of
predispositions to act.” (Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p. 37).
Dewey’s thus solved the crisis between knowledge and action by rethinking their nature and
relationship. In fact, Dewey was eager to prove that his philosophy was so different from the
previous ones that he avoided using the term “knowledge”, or “epistemology” (Field, 2022).
He showed that learning is a dimension inherent to human action, a position Schön’ also
adopted, as we will see now.

2.2 Schön’s crisis
Like Dewey, Schön identified a crisis in professional knowledge. Indeed, in The Reflective
Practitioner (1983), Schön also proposes to review the relationship between knowledge and
action by deconstructing the underlying epistemological principles of “professional
knowledge”.
Like Peirce and Dewey, Schön sees a disconnect between science and the affairs of everyday
life. The scientific model of practice that dominated during the sixties, seventies, and
eighties was known as applied science or Technical Rationality. It was believed that
professionals solved problems based on scientific theories. Medicine and law, for instance,
have clear goals (health, dispute resolution) and are based on rigorous fundamental
knowledge. Conversely, professions of lesser prestige like social work, education or urban
planning have unclear aims and do not have an established basis in scientific knowledge.
This division of occupations is reminiscent of the one described by Dewey in ancient Greece.
Schön links this divide with Positivism and the Vienna Circle (Schön, 1983, p.32). Positivists
seek the irreducible elements that make up each phenomenon, to formalize them in a way
that professionals can apply faithfully. Professionals solely “apply” and confirm the
knowledge produced by researchers. The skills with which a professional implements this
knowledge are not actually considered.
Schön, like Dewey and Peirce before him, rejects this mechanistic perspective. For him, the
main difference between the positivist view of professions and reality lies in the way
professionals deal with the problems they encounter. For Technical Rationality, professional
practice is about solving problems. But the situations faced by professionals are often
unstable, embarrassing, and without clearly defined problems. For example, building a road
is an easy problem to solve, provided you ignore the fact that it destroys the landscape and
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can bother the neighbours. This is the type of problem that professionals encounter. This
instability disturbs the positivist epistemology of professional knowledge, since including
uncertainties in a scientific model seems to run counter to rigor. However, ignoring them
removes the relevance of reflection: this is what Schön calls the “dilemma of ‘rigor and
relevance’” (Schön, 1983, p.42).
Schön recalls the importance of professionals: they are the ones who allow our society to
function. Many professionals excel in their work and solve numerous problems daily:
professional knowledge is therefore real and effective. Though, a certain discomfort arises
from the fact that this knowledge is not justified, nor explained: “Professionals have been
disturbed to find that they cannot account for processes they have come to see as central to
professional competence.” (Schön, 1983, p.19).
There is indeed a need to explain and describe professional skills. Schön believes that if
Technical Rationality does not account for professional acts, a new model is needed. It is
necessary to set up a new epistemology of practice which rejects the model of Technical
Rationality. Inspired by Dewey, Schön shows that the rejection of the current model of
applied science makes it possible to envision another source of knowledge: action. This
knowledge is tacit and resides in our actions; we act appropriately in the face of a situation,
without even thinking: “By knowing-in-action I mean the knowing built into and revealed by
our performance of everyday routines of action” (Schön, 1992, p. 124). This corresponds to
Dewey’s theory of knowledge and is precisely the type of knowledge that professionals
possess.
Similar to Dewey, Schön proposes that knowledge emanates from action. He ceases to
consider action as applied knowledge and reflection as a separate activity, bringing them
together instead: it is the famous “reflection-in-action”. In this case, “knowledge” refers to
embodied insights, tangible practices, or new processes to enact again—not to fixed
theories found in books.

2.3 A less radical but similar handling of the crisis
Although Schön’s analysis focuses on the epistemology of professional practice and not on
epistemology in general, we find that he describes the same crisis of rationality as Dewey.
He also arrives at the same conclusion: we must review our vision of “knowledge”.
Moreover, Schön, still following Dewey, emphasizes that the process to produce this
knowledge is rooted in action.
Schön is not as radical as Dewey, nor does he avoid using the terms “knowledge” or
“epistemology”. However, he clearly states that he wants to replace the “Positivist
epistemology of practice” with a new epistemology—a new way of “reflecting in action” in a
situation.
Therefore, by putting Schön’s and Dewey’s work side by side, we see that the
epistemological changes they both pinned down were profound. To make these changes
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happen, they had to suggest new ways of explaining human action and thinking. This leads
us to the explanation of the “pragmatist inquiry” and the “reflection-in-action”.

3. A similar answer: The inquiry
3.1 Pragmatist inquiry
Inspired by Peirce, Dewey developed a process to describe how “knowledge” is produced
from action: the pragmatist inquiry (Dewey, 1933 [1910], 1938). This style of inquiry is not
the only process for acquiring knowledge—Indeed, it is quite possible to discover new
possibilities for action by trial and error. Though, inquiry differs from trial and error since it
involves a reflection on the experience, not just the simple observation of a result.
The result of inquiry is not “truth”, but “warranted assertability”—Results are guaranteed in
specific situations, allowing practitioners to overcome obstacles. The term “warranted
assertability” is not just a replacement for the term “truth”: it denotes Dewey’s will to
deeply change our vision of knowledge and beliefs, and that the result of the inquiry is not
an end in itself and remains temporary.
Logic The Theory of Inquiry (1938), is the culmination of Dewey’s reflections on inquiry, and
is frequently regarded as his major work (Edman, 1938; Gérard, 1994). It lays out a definition
of the pragmatist inquiry:
“Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into
one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the
elements of the original situation into a unified whole.” (Dewey, 1938, p.105)

Pragmatist inquiry is therefore a transformation of the situation. Dewey proposes to break
the investigation process down into steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The Antecedent Conditions of Inquiry: The Indeterminate Situation
Institution of a problem
The determination of a problem-solution
Reasoning
The Operational Character of Facts-Meanings

Here is a brief articulation of these steps — The subject is in an uncertain situation; he has
doubts and finds that the elements of the situation are discordant. When the subject
becomes aware of his troubled situation, he can identify a problem. However, he must be
careful in this problematization and be ready to modify it if need be. From this
problematization, the subject will make a hypothesis and suggest a solution to the problem
posed. He will then examine, mentally, the possible consequences of this solution; this is the
reasoning step. If no major obstacles arise, he will test his hypothesis by putting it into
action. Indeed, the situation cannot be modified by mental operations alone. If the
practitioner’s experiment resolves the situation, then the investigation stops. Although, his
investigation will have likely taken on a new meaning, which demands a review of the
original problematization. Thus, the cycle of inquiry continues, allowing for the growth and
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development of the subject. Finally, one must remain cautious and not reduce the
pragmatist inquiry to a succession of steps; as Garrison (1999) pointed out, this is an
“organic” process.

3.2 Schön design inquiry
In 1983, Schön suggested that design is “a kind reflection-in-action”, or more precisely “a
reflective conversation with a unique and uncertain situation” (Schön, 1983, p. 130). We
immediately recognize the importance of the situation of the pragmatist inquiry. Schön’s
stressed that:
“In real-world practice, problems do not present themselves to the practitioner as
givens. They must be constructed from the materials of problematic situations which
are puzzling, troubling, and uncertain. In order to convert a problematic situation to a
problem, a practitioner must do a certain kind of work.” (Schön, 1983, p.40)

For Schön, Reflection-in-action is the ensemble of processes which allow for the
transformation of the situation, and consists of four stages: naming (or description of the
situation), framing, moving and evaluating.
At first, the practitioner is faced with a problematic situation which he is unable to solve
(here, the problem is raised by an architecture student): “The student has set and tried to
solve a problem and has been unable to solve the problem as set” (Schön, 1983, p. 130). It
can be said that the situation is “indeterminate”. The practitioner will then reframe the
problem: “Problem setting is a process in which, interactively, we name the things to which
we will attend and frame the context in which we will attend to them” (Schön, 1983, p. 40).
To do this, the practitioner suggests a new angle of attack: “a direction for reshaping the
situation.” (Schön, 1983, p. 131). These correspond to the “institution of a problem” and the
“determination of a problem-solution” steps of the pragmatist inquiry.
Then, the practitioner tries to check if the frame he has chosen to grasp the situation is
viable. To this end, he will conduct experiments (moving): “This he does through a web of
moves, discovered consequences, implications, appreciations and further moves.” (Schön,
1983, p. 131). Here, we have both the search for a solution (reasoning) and the tangible
experimentation from Dewey.
This set of actions taken by the practitioner produces all kinds of consequences, and some
are more interesting than others. The practitioner must therefore assess (evaluating) the
situation. This is where the concept of conversation comes into play: “But the practitioner’s
moves also produce unintended changes which give the situations new meanings. The
situation talks back, the practitioner listens; and as he appreciates what he hears, he
reframes the situation once again” (Schön, 1983, p. 132). This dialogue between practitioner
and situation is in accordance with Dewey’s affirmation: the situation cannot be restored
only mentally.
We can say that Schön adapted the pragmatist inquiry to describe professional practice,
more specifically design inquiry. Schön used Dewey’s insights on the importance of the
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situation (problems are not given) to show how designers have conversations (lead an
inquiry) not only in a situation but with it as well.

4. Reflection on reflection-in-action
We noted in this paper that Schön addressed a crisis of knowledge very similar to Dewey’s.
We also established that they arrived at a very similar “solution”: the inquiry. In the light of
this comparison, one may ask what Schön’s actual contribution was, and if his “reflection-inaction” is not just an appropriation of Dewey’s inquiry. We believe this question bothered
Schön himself, who, at the end of his life, tried to stress his own contribution.
In 1992, Schön declared that his model of design as a “conversation with the situation” is
Deweyan in nature. However, the “reflective conversation with the situation” is supposed to
supplement Dewey’s work:
“Reflective Conversation with the Situation. This is Deweyan inquiry, mediated by
conscious reflection on the situation and, at the same time, on one’s way of thinking
and acting on it. As conversation with the situation is a version of reflection-in-action,
so reflective conversation with the situation is a version of reflection on reflection-inaction—a version undertaken in the situation of action itself.” (Schön, 1992, p.126)

For Schön, “reflective practice” is more than “reflection-in-action”: it is a practice
demonstrated by those who can take a step back and review their actions, all while
performing said actions; it is “reflection on reflection-in-action”.
However, this claim is linked to two difficulties that we will now examine: first, Schön seems
inconsistent in his use of the terms “reflection-in-action” and “reflection on reflection-inaction”. Second, “reflection on reflection-in-action” is already at the heart of Dewey’s work.

4.1 Inconsistent term use by Schön
As stated previously, we wanted to see if there is really a difference between reflection-inaction (or conversation with the situation) and reflection on reflection-in-action (or the
reflective conversation with the situation). If we take the examples given by Schön in 1983,
the difference between “conversation” and “reflective conversation” does exist.
Jazz players, baseball pitchers or even children who balance blocks all conduct a
conversation with the situation (a form of reflection-in-action). These actors solve their
problems in the thick of action. In the end, the situation is transformed and typical action
resumes. But from these examples of reflection-in-action, Schön goes on to say that he is not
necessarily interested in any kind of reflection-in-action (or conversation), but specifically in
the one performed by “good” professionals and their “double vision”: “In a good process of
design, this conversation with the situation is reflective.” (Schön, 1983, p. 79). He further
adds that
“At the same time that the inquirer tries to shape the situation to his frame, he must
hold himself open to the situation’s back-talk. He must be willing to enter into new
confusions and uncertainties. Hence, he must adopt a kind of double vision. He must
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act in accordance with the view he has adopted, but he must recognize that he can
always break it open later, indeed, must break it open later in order to make new
sense of his transaction with the situation.” (Schön, 1983, p. 164)

The examples where Schön uses the term “reflective conversation with the situation” are
developed in the subsequent chapters of the book: descriptions about an architect, a
psychiatrist, a manager, and an engineer. In each example, Schön highlights the ability of
these “good” professionals not only to think in action, but also to reflect on their frame,
their role, their repertoire and to maintain the “double vision”. The chapter about the
architect is even clearly labeled as “Chapter 5: Design as a reflective conversation with the
situation”.
Being able to reflect-in-action, simply with the goal of finishing a project, is not enough to
produce knowledge. Professionals should take it one step further and reflect on their
reflection-in-action. This does not mean designers should do academic/scientific research
about their practice, but that they should be able to think about what they are doing and
improve their practice on the go.
However, Schön is not consistent in his use of the different expressions. At the end of the
chapter 5, instead of using the term “reflective conversation”, Schön goes back to
“reflection-in-action” (a simple conversation) (Schön, 1963, p.69). Sometimes, he only
differentiates “conversation” from “reflective conversation” in terms of “degree” (Schön,
1983, p.167), rather than settling on a clear distinction.
These inconsistencies lead to confusion, making it difficult to blame design researchers who
use the terms “reflective conversation” and “reflection-in-action” interchangeably. As said
earlier, we think Schön himself realized his mistake and probably wanted to clarify his
position, albeit quite late.

4.2 Not really different from Dewey?
Another concern is Schön’s claim that the “reflective conversation” is an augmented or
enhanced vision of Dewey’s inquiry—a “mediated one” (Schön, 1992b, p.126). We argue
that it is not. Indeed, several authors stress that Dewey’s inquiry is intrinsically reflective—
Knowledge, for Dewey, is a question of reflection on one’s experience and not just the act of
experiencing. Dewey emphases it in Democracy and Education:
“When we reflect upon an experience instead of just having it, we inevitably
distinguish between our own attitude and the objects toward which we sustain the
attitude […] Such reflection upon experience gives rise to a distinction of what we
experience (the experienced) and the experiencing—the how” (Dewey, 1916, p. 173).

Garrison stressed that pragmatist inquiry always implies taking a step back to see the whole
picture: “The process is continuous, involves many feedback loops, and reticulated, mutually
modifying, relations. To understand the parts, it is necessary to understand the whole, but to
understand the whole we must understand all the parts”. (Garrison, 1999, p. 302). Biesta
also clearly enunciated the importance of reflectivity in knowledge formation:
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“One important implication of this is that experience in itself does not provide us with
any knowledge. Dewey rejected, in other words, the view that experience provides us
with elementary ‘bits’ of knowledge which, when put together in a systematic of
logical manner, result in knowledge.”(Biesta, 2010, p. 108)

To transition from experience to knowledge, one needs to reflect upon their experience.
Which, to Schön, corresponds to reflection on reflection-in-action or reflective practice. This
reflectivity is what separates intelligent human action from simple human action, or trial and
error.
Thus, we disagree with Schön’s assertion that he “augmented” Dewey’s pragmatist inquiry.
In our eyes, Schön’s idea of “reflection on reflection-in-action” is not his greatest
contribution, but rather the fact that he carefully explained reflection-in-action. While
Dewey gave some general examples of the use of pragmatist inquiry, Schön’s examined
several cases of professionals conversing with the situation. Therefore, he was able to
specify some design activities, like framing, which had a major impact on design research
(Dorst, 2015).
Schön also worked on what he called “constants” in professional practice—elements that
tend to be stable during a design project and support reflection-in-action, such as the
repertoire (of solutions, cases and exemplars encountered in previous practice), or the
media (representative tools, like sketches and prototypes) of practitioners (Schön, 1983,
p.270).
To conclude, reflective practice is a form of reflection on reflection-in-action, and it produces
“knowledge” in a pragmatist fashion. We think that Schön was right to stress the difference
between reflection-in-action and reflection on reflection-in-action. However, he was not
always consistent in his explanation, and this caused some confusion. Moreover, the
Deweyan theory of knowledge is so different from what came before that its intrinsic
reflective dimension might have been difficult to understand.

5. Celebrating those similarities in a new visual representation of
reflection-in-action
To complement these reflections on reflective practice, we tried to illustrate the
“transaction with the situation” (figure 1) described by both Dewey (1938) and Schön (1983).
To stress the importance of the “situation”, we added several references to it. First, the
whole background of our visual representation is the situation, because as Dewey stressed,
action always happens in a situation. Second, we added dark green arrows that correspond
to the continuous transaction with this situation. Practitioners are not just in the situation,
they must deal with it, transform it. This is also conveyed by the triangle at the beginning of
the process of inquiry: practitioners encounter indeterminate situations. Indeed, “The first
attitude developed by the subject toward the indeterminate situation is therefore of an
‘interrogative’ nature. The situation is ‘questionable’; the investigator asks questions
(Schön’s talks and moves)” (Bousbaci, 2020, p. 250, we translate). After the inquiry, the
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situation will be more determinate, but not perfectly “rounded up”—hence the oval shape
at the end of our graphic.

Figure 1. Reflection-in-action as a transaction with the situation

The process of reflection-in-action is composed of loops, each corresponding to a new
frame. As such, it underlines the process of framing and reframing (or re/definition of the
situation). In each loop, designers try to find a solution to their problem through reasoning,
using their favoured “media” (like the architect’s sketch pad) to converse with the situation
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by making moves (and evaluating their consequences). As opposed to a cognitivist approach,
they are in conversation with the situation, actively modifying it (dark green arrows).
We also added the “repertoire” (Schön, 1983, p.270) to the graphic, to stress that designers’
prior knowledge allows them to frame the situation and establish a new hypothesis (which
correspond to Dewey’s “continuity” of knowledge).
Contrary to a concentric spiral model of the design process (see Wynn, D., & Clarkson, J.,
2005, p. 36), this representation is “open”. This clarifies the “content” of each loop, but also
makes the size of each loop variable. Indeed, in the design inquiry, the designers must
sometimes change their frame—for example, to go back to a “larger” frame and start over
with the definition of the situation. While the image of a concentric spiral gives the
impression that the designers “withdraw” into themselves and their solution, this
representation highlights the fact that it is necessary for designers to be open to the
situation—to be in conversation with it.
One limit of this graphic is that it only represents reflection-in action, not reflection on
reflection in action (or reflective practice). However, by asking students or professional
designers to detail their process, we make them conscious of their reflection-in-action. Thus,
using this model in the classroom is a form of reflection on reflection-in-action, but it is done
after the action. To become true reflective practitioners, students would have to internalize
the model (and the concepts that it represents) and use it in the midst of action.

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we described the confusion between “reflection-in-action” and “reflection on
the reflection-in-action” in Schön’s writing. While this inconsistency may prove unimportant,
Schön’s himself tried to clarify it—which caught our attention. Moreover, this confusion has
already been stressed in design studies (Friedman, 2008). Thus, we offered a new avenue to
clarify the difference between those two expressions by going back to Dewey’s work on the
pragmatist inquiry.
By re-examining the philosophy that inspired Schön—pragmatism—we were able to specify
the origins of his epistemology of practice. We saw that his interpretation of design practice
as a conversation with the situation closely resembles Dewey’ inquiry. Both tried to
overcome the tenuous relationship between action and knowledge, which tended to
separate human action from rationality.
By reinstating practice (be it professional or general) as a source of knowledge, both authors
defined a new epistemology of practice. Practitioners are not blindly applying theories made
for them by researchers. They reflect upon their actions while conducting them: this is
reflection-in-action. The idea that there is knowledge in practice is what Schön’s calls
“knowing in action”.
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However—and this is where resided the alleged difference between the two authors—
“reflection-in-action” is not solely enough to produce knowledge: one needs to take a step
back and reflect on their reflection-in-action. Practitioners can produce their own knowledge
and become “researchers in the context of practice” (Schön, 1983).
Neither Dewey’s initial description of the pragmatist inquiry nor Schön’s “conversation with
the situation” model explicitly mention this “step back”; though, both Schön’s and Dewey’s
writings stress the importance of reflectivity. This nuance might be at the heart of this
confusion.
In the end, our move to clarify the situation was to represent the design inquiry, the
reflection-in-action that designers follow, using both Dewey’s and Schön’s theories. But we
could not represent “reflection on reflection-in-action”: this is a process that each one of us
needs to do by themselves in order to produce knowledge.
We think it is important to clarify Schön’s work, because the epistemology of practice
defended by Dewey and Schön is often challenged. We can see that positivist epistemology
of practice is still present in new design disciplines, like engineering design (McMahon,
2021), game design (Chiapello, 2017) or design management (Johansson-Sköldberg et al.,
2013). By outlining how pragmatist epistemology is tied to professional practice, we
contribute to better describe designers’ activities. We also hope to participate in furthering
design research using pragmatist foundations (Bousbaci, 2020; Chiapello, 2019, 2021).
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Ke Medley for his English
vocabulary and grammar corrections.
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